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HOW AN INSTRUMENTAL VIEW OF LAW CORRODES
THE RULE OF LAW
Brian Z. Tamanaha*

INTRODUCTION'

The legal tradition in the United States combines two core ideas.
The first idea, known broadly as the rule of law, is that government
officials and citizens are obligated to abide by the regime of legal rules
that govern their conduct. The second idea, what I call legal instrumentalism, is that law is a means to an end or an instrument for the
social good. Both ideas are taken for granted and are equally fundamental in contemporary U.S. legal culture. It is seldom recognized
that the combination of these two ideas is a unique historical development of relatively recent provenance and that, in certain crucial respects, they are a mismatched pair.
The rule of law is a centuries-old ideal, but the notion that law is a
means to an end became entrenched only in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That view of law was famously advocated by Jeremy Bentham and Rudolph von Jhering, and in the
United States by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, and the Legal Realists. These theorists argued that law should be declared at our
will and shaped to achieve our collective social purposes. Prior to
their arguments, law-the common law in particular-was characterized as the immanent order of natural principles or of the customs and
moral norms of the society or community. Law is not an empty vessel
to be filled in by our leave; rather, law is predetermined in some
sense, consistent with what is necessary and right.
To set the stage for this exploration, a central dynamic driving the
situation will be reviewed at the outset. The instrumental view of law
was promoted as an integrated two-part proposition: law is an instrument to serve the social good. In the course of the twentieth century,
the first part of the proposition swept the legal culture, while the sec* Benjamin N. Cardozo Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1. The basic ideas in this Article are taken from a more extensive historical and theoretical
work that explores the emergence of an instrumental view of law and its consequences. See
generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW
(2006).
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ond part became increasingly problematic. Many came to believe that
there is no such thing as a social good, or that there is no way to
identify or agree upon what constitutes the social good. Interests inevitably conflict; people and groups have fundamentally clashing values, and there are no independent or absolute standards to resolve
such disputes. An instrumental view of law in the context of intransigent disagreement over the social good leads to a battle of all against
all through and over the legal order itself-a battle to seize the implements of law and wield its coercive force against opposing groups.
This battle, many signs of which can be seen today, takes place in legislation, in administrative and executive actions, and in judicial appointments and judging. Law is not seen as an order of binding rules,
but increasingly as a tool or weapon to be manipulated to achieve
desired ends. Therein lies the deep rub between an instrumental view
of law and the rule of law ideal.
This Article discusses four specific points of tension between the
rule of law ideal and an instrumental view of law. The first two points
relate primarily to legislative and executive actions, the final two relate mainly to the judiciary. The first point focuses on the fact that the
instrumental view of law came at the expense of the classical rule of
law ideal that there are independent legal limits on law itself. The
second point involves the implications of the disagreement over the
social good. The third point relates to the detrimental consequences
on binding legal rules of purposive and pragmatic judicial reasoning
oriented toward ends. The final point involves widespread doubts
about the very possibility of judicial objectivity, doubts which undermine the notion of the rule of law.
Before taking up these four points, a brief discussion of the shifting
legal theories in the 1960s and 1970s is necessary. This pivotal period
marked both the entrenchment of an instrumental view of law and the
presence of sharp conflict over the social good.
II.

LEGAL INSTRUMENTALISM AND MORAL RELATIVISM IN
THE ACADEMY

A massive social upheaval rocked the United States in the 1960s
and 1970s, including civil rights marches and boycotts, violent protests
against the Vietnam War, political assassinations and bombings, economic insecurity, the drug culture, and the political corruption of
Watergate. Law was caught in the middle of this social-political conflagration. People on the left saw law line up on the side of power and
privilege, answering peaceful marches and sit-ins with nightsticks and
snapping dogs. People on the right thought that defiant displays of
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civil disobedience threatened social order and were encouraged by the
meek response of law enforcement. Progressives cheered the Warren
Court as the one legal institution doing the right thing, while the right
despised the Justices as activist usurpers writing their own personal
liberal views into the Constitution. All sides thought it evident that a
"crisis of liberal legalism" was at hand.2
Legal historian Calvin Woodard wrote in 1968 that prevailing attitudes within the legal academy were thoroughly Legal Realist. Notwithstanding the silencing of the Legal Realists in the course of the
Second World War, the resonance of their critiques of conceptual and
rule formalism continued like a subterranean river. "At least in the
better law schools," Woodard remarked, "'functionalists' and 'realists'
are no longer lonely aliens in a hostile world. In truth they probably
outweigh in influence, if not in number, the Langdellians. '' 3 This realistic perspective portrayed law as a means to an end. Graduates from
the better law schools, he might have added, became professors at law
schools across the land, carrying with them and further propagating
these views.
Woodard recognized that responsibility for the triumph of instrumental views of law could not be laid on the Realists alone:
[T]he society-wide trend toward secularization is the culmination of
a centuries-long development that has transformed the Law from a
"brooding omnipresence in the sky" into a down-to-earth instrument of social reform and, at the same time, translated ... the lawyer from a quasi-priestly figure into a social engineer. Legal
... has both reflected and contributed to this long-term
education
4
trend.

Over the course of the twentieth century, society at large underwent a
general loss of belief in objectively existing principles. 5 With a seemingly irresistible momentum, "the knowledge of good and evil, as an
intellectual subject, was being systematically and effectively destroyed."' 6 The twentieth century brought the "disenchantment" of
the world. The spectacular evil and suffering inflicted by all sides, on
all sides, in two World Wars, followed by the rise of Soviet totalitarianism, pummeled the faith in reason and human progress that in2.
3.
689,
4.
5.

Lester Mazor, The Crisis of Liberal Legalism, 81 YALE L.J. 1032 (1972) (book review).
Calvin Woodard, The Limits of Legal Realism: An HistoricalPerspective, 54 VA. L. REV.
732 (1968).
Id. at 733.
See RICHARD TARNAS, THE PASSION OF THE WESTERN MIND: UNDERSTANDING THE

IDEAS THAT HAVE SHAPED OUR WORLD VIEW (1991) (providing an unparalleled historical

exploration of the ideas that led to this state).
6. Arthur Allen Leff, Commentary, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 454 (1974) [hereinafter Leff, Economic Analysis of Law].
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formed so much of eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century
7
political thought.
Woodard was generally supportive of an instrumental view of law,
but he sounded a cautionary note:
Predictably, the result [of these ideas] is a generation of law teachers who find it difficult to believe-by this I mean profoundly believe-in the existence of law beyond what fallible courts say it is; a
generation of law students who consequently do not learn to be restrained in any essential way by the law ....8
A decade later, the Dean of Cornell Law School, Roger Cramton,
wrote that legal instrumentalism had become "the 'ordinary religion'
of the law school classroom." 9 This "orthodox" wisdom, conveyed by
law professors to their students, is "an instrumental approach to law
and lawyering," along with "a skeptical attitude toward generalizations," principles, and received wisdom.' 0 Cramton credited (or
blamed) Holmes, the Legal Realists, and pragmatism for these attitudes about law:
Today law tends to be viewed in solely instrumental terms and as
lacking values of its own, other than a limited agreement on certain
''process values" thought to be implicit in our democratic way of
doing things. We agree on methods of resolving our disagreements
in the public arena, but on little else. Substantive goals come from
the political process or from private interests in the community.
The lawyer's task, in an instrumental approach to law, is to facilitate
and manipulate legal processes to advance the interest of his
client."
Cramton captured the prevailing view that law was an empty vessel,
and that lawyers utilized legal rules and processes instrumentally for
clients. Students were taught that everything is up for argument, and
that legal rules are not binding dictates, but resources to be strategically marshaled and presented with rhetorical agility.
There is a temptation to shrug "so what?" at this instrumental characterization of law, because it is now so routine. Woodard and Cramton found it worthy of comment because, although it had been
creeping up for decades, it was contrary to earlier ways of teaching
law, the memory of which had not yet been extinguished. They wor7. See generally ROBERT A.

NISBET, SOCIAL CHANGE AND HISTORY:

ASPECTS OF THE WEST-

(1969).
8. Woodard, supra note 3, at 734.
9. Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.
EDUC. 247, 247 (1978).
10. Id. at 248.
11. Id. at 257.
ERN THEORY OF DEVELOPMENT

LEGAL
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ried openly about the unknown implications of the purely instrumental view of law being purveyed in law schools.
Cynicism about government was also in full bloom. Another prominent legal historian, G. Edward White, observed in 1973 that a feature
of contemporary life was "an acknowledged gap between the goals of
officeholders and those of their constituents, as well as a widespread
view that those same officeholders are furthering their own goals
while merely paying lip service to their constituents' needs." 12 Critics
of government were "linked in their perception that terms such as
'public interest' and 'social welfare' have lost their meaning: the
terms are capable of such wide, divergent, and contradictory interpre13
tations that they are useless as standards of performance."
"A final and possibly the most significant aspect of American culture in the 1970's," White remarked, "is the disintegration of common
values or goals. In the place of consensual values around which members of American society can cohere stand sets of polar alternatives."'1 4 Beyond the sharp disagreement over values was the bleak
prospect that without access to absolute moral standards, these disputes might never be resolved. Arthur Leff remarked in 1974 that the
absence of objective moral foundations "is a fact of modern intellectual life so well and painfully known as to be one of the few which is
simultaneously horrifying and banal."' 15 Leff's 1979 article, Unspeakable Ethics, UnnaturalLaw, raised a hopeless plea for some source of
moral and legal grounding in an apparently groundless world. 16 Initially confident that objective principles could be better secured in
reason or science, moderns had banished God and natural law only to
arrive at an unanticipated and apparently insurmountable destination:
"There is no such thing as an unchallengeableevaluative system. There
is no way to prove one ethical or legal system superior to any other,
unless at some point an evaluator is asserted to have the final, uncontradictable, unexaminable word.' 7 His essay memorably left off with
the words "God help us."' 18 Critical legal theorist Roberto Mangabeira Unger's Knowledge and Politics, so influential among the radical left, argued that the modern belief in the subjectivity of values
drove deep contradictions into liberal legal systems with no evident
12. G. Edward White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: JurisprudentialCriticism and
Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV. 279, 295 (1973).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 296.
15. Leff, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 6, at 455.
16. Arthur Allen Left, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229.
17. Id. at 1240.
18. Id. at 1249.
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solution.19 It ended on a note of despair: "Speak, God." 20° At the
time there was a palpable awareness in the air that society and law
had been cut adrift from their old moorings-with no new anchorage
in sight.
By the mid-1970s, the law was pervasively seen in purely instrumental terms and there was sharp social disagreement over the public
good, combined with a loss of faith in the possibility of a resolution.
The contemporary dynamic that drives the tension between the rule of
law and an instrumental view of law was thus set in place.
III.

LAW, DETERIORATION
COMMON GOOD

COLLAPSE OF HIGHER

OF THE

Over the past two hundred years, U.S. legal culture has been deprived of two sets of ideals that provided the foundation for the law
for more than a millennium. The defining characteristic of the first set
of ideals was that law consists of fundamental principles, which the
sovereign lawmaker is bound to obey. This was the traditional understanding of the rule of law-the notion that there are legal limits on
law itself,limits derived from divine law, natural law, principles of reason, or customs descended from time immemorial. 21 The defining
characteristic of the second set of ideals was that law represents the
common good and public welfare. This quality made the law of and
for the community, deserving of obedience by citizens.
Both of these sets of ideals provided important underpinnings for
the rule of law. The former idea conveyed the sense that there are
unalterable legal limits on law; the latter idea indicated why the law is
entitled to rule. This Part will articulate the role and function formerly played by these long-standing ideas and the consequences of
the vacuum left by their decline.
A.

Collapse of Higher Limits on Law

Natural law, principles of reason, and customs from time immemorial were thought to be the source of, to be binding upon, and to be
superior to, the positive law of the state. Thomas Aquinas famously
asserted that "[a] law that is unjust seems not to be a law."' 22 Thus, he
continued: "[E]very human positive law has the nature of law to the
extent that it is derived from the Natural Law. If, however, in some
19. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS (1975).
20. Id. at 295.
21. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY,
(2004) [hereinafter

22.

TAMANAHA,

POLITICS, THEORY

ON THE RULE OF LAW].

THOMAS AQUINAS, THE TREATISE ON LAW

327 (R.J. Henle ed., 1993).
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point it conflicts with the law of nature it will no longer be law but
rather a perversion of law."'2 3 William Blackstone echoed this position: "This law of nature .. . is of course superior in obligation to any
other.... [N]o human laws are of any validity, if contrary to this; and
such of them as are valid derive all their force, and all their authority,
mediately or immediately, from this original. '' 24 The idea was that
there are legal limits on the law itself-that legal officials are legally
bound to higher law. This was at the core of early English under25
standings of the ancient constitution and the common law.
This view of the primacy of unwritten law over legislation was standard when the colonies were established. The 1677 Charter of Fundamental Laws of West New Jersey "began with the provision that the
'common law or fundamental rights' of the colony should be 'the
foundation of government, which is not to be altered by the Legislative authority."' 26 Historian Daniel Boorstin found in the colonial period a "widely accepted assumption that there were definite limits
which the legislators were not free to transgress, '2 7 limits comprised
of what were understood to be ancient common-law provisions as well
as certain passages of Scripture. The prevailing belief was "that the
primary and normal way of developing civil institutions was by custom
and tradition rather than by legislative or administrative fiat."2 8s Leading up to and following the revolution, a number of state courts invalidated legislation thought to be contrary to natural law or fundamental
29
common-law rights.
Belief in natural law and in the primacy of the common law continued to influence jurists throughout the nineteenth century. A 1905
study of the jurisprudence of the preceding century found that
"[s]everal American courts have asserted the doctrine that the judiciary can disregard a statute which plainly violates the fundamental
principles of natural justice, although it may not contravene any particular constitutional provisions. '30 Judges used narrow or defeating
constructions to effectively control legislation: "Indeed, one of the
23. Id. at 288.
24. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF THE LAW 49 (Univ. of Chi. Press
1996) (1941) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *41).
25. See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A
STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY (W.W. Norton &
Co. 1967) (1957).
26. LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 7 (1999).
27. DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 20 (1958).
28. Id.
29. Charles G. Haines, Political Theories of the Supreme Court from 1789-1835, 2 AM. POL.
Sc. REV. 221, 222-23 (1908).
30. SIMEON E. BALDWIN, THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 118 (1905).
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rules of statutory construction, 'statutes in derogation of the common
law are to be construed strictly,' constituted for many years a check on
legislative innovation far more subtle but scarcely less stringent than
written constitutional limitations. ' 31 Roscoe Pound remarked in 1910
that "[j]udges and jurists do not hesitate to assert that there are extraconstitutional limits to legislative power which put fundamental
32
common-law dogmas beyond the reach of statutes.
In the course of the early twentieth century, when the noninstrumental understanding of the common law gave way to the instrumental view, the notion that the common law and natural principles
constitute limits on legislation was also swept away. Many factors
contributed to undermining old notions of natural principles and the
common law: the implications of the Enlightenment, the secularization of society, doubts about the existence of objective moral principles, a culturally heterogeneous and class differentiated populace,
pitched battles among groups with conflicting economic interests, an
increasingly specialized economy with complex regulatory regimes far
beyond the ken of common-law concepts, and a general disenchantment with the world in the twentieth century. After this denouement,
the only substantive restrictions on legislation were those found in the
Constitution.
Constitutional enforcement of substantive limits on lawmaking,
while similar in function to classical rule of law limits like natural law,
is different in a fundamental respect. Classical rule of law limits were
thought to exist entirely apart from the will of lawmakers. The Declaration of Independence reflected this understanding: "We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights . ... 33 The
Ninth Amendment of the Constitution voiced the same sentiment:
"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people. '34 A
widely shared understanding at the time was that "[c]ommon law and
written constitutions expressed and elaborated these notions [of fundamental rights and limits on government], but did not create
them."' 35 Up through the early twentieth century many judges still
thought that the Bill of Rights was "merely declaratory of fundamen31.

CLYDE E. JACOBS. LAW WRITERS AND THE COURTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THOMAS

G. TIEDEMAN, AND JOHN F. DILLON
LAW 10 (Da Capo Press 1973) (1954) (citation omitted).
COOLEY, CHRISTOPHER

32.
33.
34.
35.

M.

UPON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL

Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 27 (1910).
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
U.S. CONST. amend IX.
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 561 (2d ed. 1988).
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tal natural rights" and "legislation is to be judged by those rights and
'36
not by the constitutional texts in which they are declared.
This view did not survive the twentieth century. As belief in natural
law waned, the Supreme Court came to characterize rights and restraints on legislative powers in positivist terms tied to the language of
the Constitution. The only limits on legislation were those limits specified in the Constitution, though not always restricted to the explicit
text. Identical to ordinary legislation, such limits were the product of
will-based lawmaking. "[I1n the American written Constitution,"
wrote eminent constitutional scholar Edward Corwin, "higher law at
last attained a form which made possible the attribution to it of an
entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute emanating from
the sovereign people.' '37 The supremacy of the Constitution came to
'3 8
be understood as grounded upon "its rootage in popular will."
Every provision of the Constitution can be altered or abolished by
amendment, albeit with high hurdles to scale. This understanding is
radically unlike former limits imposed by natural principles and common-law principles, which were not the product of human will but
were immanent principles of right. Another important difference is
that rights were formerly thought of as absolute, whereas the modern
approach, consistent with the instrumental view, involved balancing
rights against social interests.
B.

The Consequence of the Collapse

Constitutional restrictions provide a new form of limitation that accomplishes some of the work done by the older understandings, but it
does so in a reduced sense. It is law limiting itself, a step higher, but
still a contingent body of law that can be changed through amendment
or reinterpretation, if so desired. Lost in this transformation was the
time-honored understanding that there are certain things the government and legal officials absolutely cannot do with and through lawthat the law possesses integrity unto itself and must comport with
standards of good and right. The elimination of this former standard
is emphasized in legal theorist Joseph Raz's description of what, under
modern understandings, can be entirely consistent with the rule of
law: "A non-democratic legal system, based on the denial of human
rights, on extensive poverty, on racial segregation, sexual inequalities,
36. Pound, supra note 32, at 28.
37. Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pt.
2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 409 (1929).
38. Edward S.Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (pt.
1). 42 HARV. L. REV. 149, 152 (1928).
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and religious persecution may, in principle, conform to the require-

ments of the rule of law.

..

.,39

The government must abide by and

apply stable and certain general rules set out publicly in advance. Beyond these minimal formal characteristics, the law can consist of any
content and serve any end whatsoever. Legal arguments can even be
40
made to justify torture, as we have seen.
When law was thought to have an inherent and inviolable integrity,
invocations of that core provided a source within law to resist malign
uses of the law. Instrumentalism, in contrast, entails only means-ends
reasoning. Once an end has been decided upon, law can be used in
any way necessary to advance the designated end, without limit. Instrumental questions may be raised about the efficiency of law in
achieving ends, but as long as the formal or procedural requirements
of law are met, there can be no legal objections against using law in an
abhorrent or evil fashion.
When the law has been deprived of its own integrity, it is nothing
but an instrument to be utilized in whatever way necessary to achieve
the ends desired. There is little to separate law from any other tool or
weapon. The legitimacy of law then rides on the rightness of the ends
the law is utilized to advance. That is the next subject.
C.

The Historical Primacy of the "Common Good" Ideal

A constant refrain in the history of the rule of law ideal is that the
law should be for the common good. Plato asserted that the laws
should be "for the sake of what is common to the whole city. ''4 1 Aristotle wrote that a true government must have just laws, and just laws
are oriented towards the "common interest. ' 42 Aquinas defined law
as "a certain dictate of reason for the Common Good. ' 43 John Locke
insisted that, as a matter of natural law, the legislative power "in the
' 44
utmost bounds of it, is limited to the public good of the society.
This idea has been central to U.S. legal tradition since its inception.
It appears in the Mayflower Compact-the founding political document of the colonies written two generations before Locke's famous
Second Treatise:
39.

JOSEPH

RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE
210, 211 (1979).

AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON

LAW AND MORALITY

40. See THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAm (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua
L. Dratel eds., 2005).
41. THE LAWS OF PLATO 101 (Thomas L. Pangle trans., 1980).
42. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 86-117 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
43. AQUINAS, supra note 22, at 145.
44. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 76 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952)
(1690).
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[It was a covenant to form] a civill body politick, for our better ordering and preservation .. .to enacte, constitute, and frame such
just and equall lawes, ordinances, acts, constitutions, and offices,
from time to time, as shall be thought most meete and convenient
for the general good of the45Colonie, unto which we promise all due
submission and obedience.
The very first charge against King George in the Declaration of Independence was his refusal to assent to laws "most wholesome and nec' 46
essary for the public good.
The negative corollary of the assertion that legal power is legitimate
only when used to further the common good is that it is inappropriate
for law to benefit particular groups within society at the expense of
the common good. This, too, has been a constant theme in U.S political-legal culture from the founding. Article VII of the Massachusetts
Constitution expresses the common good ideal and its negative corollary: "Government is instituted for the common good; for the protection, safety, prosperity and happiness of the people; and not for the
profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of
men." 4 7 Historian of the American Revolution Bernard Bailyn observed that the founders' goal was that "the system would lead to the
selection as representatives those who would be likely to stand above
special interests and pursue the true interests of all their constituents,
'48
as well as the common good of society.
To recount the historical primacy of this ideal is not to say it has
always been believed or honored. Innumerable political writers have
noted that law regularly serves particular interests, often those of the
elite and powerful. According to Plato, Thrasymachus declared that
justice is the interest of the stronger. 49 In modern times, Karl Marx
said much the same. Clear-eyed about law even as a young man, Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected this position:
This tacit assumption of the solidarity of the interests of society is
very common, but seems to us to be false .... [I]n the last resort a
man rightly prefers his own interest to that of his neighbors. And
this is as true in legislation as in any other form of corporate action .... [W]hatever body may possess the supreme power for the
moment is certain to have interests inconsistent with others which
have competed unsuccessfully. The more powerful interests must
45. Corwin, supra note 37, at 387 (quoting WILLIAM MACDONALD, DOCUMENTARY SOURCE
BOOK OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1606-1926, at 19 (3d ed. 1926)).
46. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776).
47. MASS. CONST. art. VII.
48. BERNARD BAILYN, To BEGIN THE WORLD ANEW:

THE GENIUS AND AMBIGUITIES OF

THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS 117 (Vintage Books 2004) (2003).
49. THE REPUBLIC OF PLATO (Allan Bloom trans., 2d ed. 1991).
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be more or less reflected in legislation; which, like every other device of man50 or beast, must tend in the long run to aid the survival of
the fittest.
Legislation, he said, "is necessarily made a means by which a body,
having the power, put burdens which are disagreeable to them on the
shoulders of somebody else."' 51 The only prospect for tempering this
tendency that Holmes could envision was the spread of an educated
sympathy among the dominant groups to "reduce the sacrifice" required of minorities.5 2 Accordingly, he said, "[i1t is no sufficient condemnation of legislation that it favors one class at the expense of
another; for much or all legislation does that; and none the less when
'53
the bona fide object is the greatest good of the greatest number.
Awareness that reality often disappoints does not in itself discredit
the ideal. Even Holmes thought law could and should promote sound
social policy. The underlying point of these accounts is that what entitles the law to obedience, at least in the eyes of the citizenry, is the
claim that it furthers the public good.
D. Judicial Tainting of the Notion of the Common Good
Two main sources have contributed to the deterioration of the notion of the common good within U.S. culture, one particular to law,
and another related to general social attitudes and understandings.
The legal contribution was the stain left by courts that invoked the
general welfare or public purpose notion when striking down legislation in the late nineteenth century. Judges in this period scrutinized
the legislatively designated purpose of a statute to determine whether,
by their own lights, it was real. 54 The Missouri Supreme Court in
1893, for example, invalidated legislation that prohibited mining and
manufacturing companies from the abusive practice of paying employees their wages in scrip redeemable only at company stores: "If [the
statute] can stand, it is difficult to see an end to such legislation, and
the government becomes one of special privileges, instead of a compact 'to promote the general welfare of the people."' 55 Time and
again, courts utilized this reasoning to void legislation that extended
protection to employees and unions, as well as other types of legislation. In the name of prohibiting laws that favored special interests,
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Summary of Events, The Gas-Stokers' Strike, 7 AM. L. REv. 582, 583 (1873).
Id. at 584.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 584.
For an excellent exploration of these decisions, see JACOBs, supra note 31.
State v. Loomis, 22 S.W. 350, 352 (Mo. 1893).
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the courts appeared to be protecting the special interests of employers
and capital.
Judges could no longer be trusted to decide questions about legitimate public purposes. In the mid-1930s, under pressure from critics,
courts abdicated a monitoring role in economic legislation. The question of whether legislation furthers the common good was effectively
left to the legislature without any check. This development eliminated
a key structural feature of the system. The founding generation invested faith in the judiciary to stand above and serve as an effective
check on special interests. In the FederalistPapers,Alexander Hamilton wrote that "the independence of the Judges may be an essential
safe-guard" because "[it] not only serves to moderate the immediate
mischiefs of those [laws] which may have been passed, but it operates
'56
as a check upon the Legislative body in passing them.
E.

Battles to Seize the Law

The growing skepticism about judges was also a product of, and exacerbated by, broader shifts in social circumstances and understandings-particularly the economic clashes that dominated the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Many of the Realists, like
others of their time, reposed an inordinate faith in the capacity of social science to help decide disputes over the common good or public
welfare. The difficulties in resolving these questions were subsequently glossed over in the spirit of consensus that prevailed in the
aftermath of the Second World War. The clashes that broke out in the
1960s and 1970s, many of which continue to this day, changed everything. Fundamental disputes exist over what social justice requires,
the proper trade-offs between liberty and equality or between formal
and substantive equality, the enforcement of moral and religious
norms in the public and private spheres, the rights of women, minorities, and gays and lesbians, the appropriate distribution of resources
and opportunities, conditions of employment, the balance between economic development and harm to the environment, and so on. The
old faith that the sciences will supply answers to these questions now
smacks of naivet6-the natural and social sciences are themselves
caught up in the battles among groups, with contrary studies enlisted
to serve all sides.
Modern epistemological skepticism leads many to believe that these
disputes are impossible to resolve. Reflected in the academic phrase
"incommensurable paradigms," it is thought that people on opposing
56.

THE FEDERALIST
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sides begin from fundamentally incompatible premises that preclude
agreement. Characteristic of this view is the final riposte in an argument-"I guess we just see the world differently"-after which the
disputing parties walk away convinced in the soundness of their position, seeing no need to further contemplate or engage the opposition.
These attitudes fuel the militant "groupism" that is a standout feature
of contemporary discourse.
Using every available legal channel, beginning in the 1960s and continuing today, a multitude of groups aggressively pursue their agendas:
women's groups, immigrant groups, gay rights groups, fundamentalist
Christian groups, racial or ethnic groups, environmental groups, labor
unions, libertarians, consumer groups, trade associations, merchants
associations, professional associations, and more. All of these groups
confront one another in various legal arenas-in cause litigation, in
legislative and administrative lobbying, and in battles over judicial appointments-and routinely claim to be acting in the name of the public good.
Under such circumstances, it may appear advisable to try to find the
most acceptable balance among the competing interests. Pound proposed this as the goal of an instrumental approach to law. 57 Finding a
balance among competing interests, it should be noted, is not the same
as the classical ideal of a shared common good. Bailyn summarized
Hamilton's position: "The goal of representation ...was not to mirror the infinity of private interests in the way a pure democracy would
do, but to meld the contesting forces into the permanent and collective interests of the nation."' 58 The idea was to find a position that "in
'59
the end would benefit all."
Current attitudes toward law, however, often do not even strive for
the less ambitious goal of balancing. Combatants are not seeking to
find a compromise or balance among competing interests; individuals
and groups vigorously seek to secure the legal enforcement of their
particular agenda to the exclusion of others. Dialogue with opponents
is dismissed as pointless; groups have their own truths, so it is better to
prevail over the other side than risk being defeated. This set of attitudes-admittedly a construct-comprises an aggressive posture that
strives for nothing less than victory within and through the law.
The combatants do not necessarily envision themselves as pursuing
their particular group interests at the expense of the common good.
Building upon a cluster of familiar ideas that have persisted in U.S.
57. Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence,8 COLUM. L.
58. BAILYN, supra note 48, at 117-18.
59. Id. at 118.
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political-legal culture for more than two centuries, they believe it is
possible to pursue one's own particular agenda through law and
thereby promote the public good. They rely on a number of rationales: the liberal idea that the public good is advanced as if by an
invisible hand when individuals pursue their own good; the Social
Darwinist idea that society involves a competitive struggle in which
the fittest survive and moves society forward; 60 the marketplace of
ideas image, in which ideas are tested under fire, with truth and merit
emerging victorious-as Holmes put it, "the best test of truth is the
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market"; 61 the democratic ethos that whatever prevails in a political
contest has earned the stamp of community consent; and the adversarial legal system in which parties are wrung through a litigation procedure that produces deserving winners and losers.
Common to these ideas is that they encourage participants to pursue only their individual or group agendas. They involve a process of
competitive combat, they invest faith in the capacity of the process to
select or produce the correct outcome, they draw upon metaphors to
discredit interference with the "natural" workings of the process as
improper meddling that generates distortions, and they assert that
winning is verification of right or entitlement. The victors or survivors
or products of these processes, by having gone through and prevailed,
are anointed with representing the public or common good.
The losers don't see it that way. They complain that the process
unfairly rewards those with greater resources, that the system has a
built-in tilt against them, that the decisionmakers are biased or corrupt, that competition or combat is not a proper way to decide what is
right, and that winners are the most rapacious or unscrupulous rather
than the most deserving. But these complaints have little traction. If
there is no way to agree upon a shared common good, if positions
cannot somehow be combined or superseded at a higher level, there
appears to be no alternative to leaving it to the ordeal of combat to
pick winners.
The idea that the law represents the common good is hard-pressed
to hold up under these circumstances. The law is little more than the
spoils that go to winners in contests among private interests, who by
their victory secure the prize of enlisting the coercive power of the
legal apparatus to enforce their agendas. What keeps the losing combatants in line, what convinces them to abide by the rule of law, is not
60. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN
(George Braziller, Inc. rev. ed. 1959) (1944).
61. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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the normative obligation generated by the fact that the law represents
the common good in which they share. Losers comply because of the
threat that the legal apparatus will apply force to secure compliance
over the unwilling, and out of the hope that they might prevail in future contests and take their turn to wield the law.
This is a barren vision. It is the rule of some groups over others by
and through the law, rather than a community united under the rule of
law. This is entirely unlike the traditional view that the law is entitled
to rule because it is in the good of all.
IV.

THE THREAT TO LEGALITY

The preceding two points of tension emphasized that the old notion-that law is limited by immanent legal standards of right and
good-no longer holds sway. The old notion that the power of law is
to be utilized only to advance the common good has deteriorated, and
both of these old ideas represented essential underpinnings of the rule
of law tradition. The final two points of tension shift the focus to the
idea of legality-to what it means to be governed by a system of rules.
The preceding Part asked why the law should rule if it has no integrity
or built-in right, and does not necessarily represent the common good.
This Part asks, in the judicial context, whether the law does in fact
rule.
The U.S. legal system is in imminent danger of becoming less of a
system of law. This assertion will be demonstrated through two familiar themes in the context of judging. The first is that the rule-bound
character of the system is reduced when achieving purposes or focusing on ends becomes the paramount goal of judges. The second is that
a legal system requires that judges render decisions according to the
applicable rules, not according to their own political views or preferences. Both of these themes raise vexing issues about the separation
of law and politics in the decisionmaking of judges. The legal quality
of the system-the reality of the rule of law-hinges upon how these
issues are resolved.
A.

How Purposive OrientationDetracts from Rules

Friedrich Hayek offered a highly influential definition of the rule of
law:
Stripped of all technicalities, this means that government in all its
actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand-rules
which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the author-
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to plan
ity will use its coercive powers in given circumstances 6and
2
one's individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge.
In legal theory circles, this is labeled the "formal" understanding of
the rule of law because it focuses only on the formal characteristics of
law rather than on its content. The core idea is that the government
must abide by legal rules declared publicly in advance.
The formal rule of law is complementary to an instrumental view of
law when considered in connection with legislative declarations of
law. Both the formal rule of law and an instrumental approach hold
that law is an empty vessel that can consist of any content and serve
any end. Lon Fuller remarked that the formal rule of law is "indifferent toward the substantive aims of law and is ready to serve a variety
of such aims with equal efficacy."' 63 That is precisely how the instrumental approach portrays law.
When moving from legislation to judging, however, the proposition
that judges should strive to achieve purposes and ends when deciding
cases, which has also been promoted as an aspect of the instrumental
view of law, raises a direct conflict with the formal rule of law. Proponents of an instrumental approach to law-from Pound, to the Realists, to the Legal Process School, to contemporary legal pragmatistshave urged that judges pay attention to social consequences and strive
to achieve legislative purposes and social policies when deciding cases.
Sensible as this might sound at first blush, this approach necessarily
diminishes the rule-bound quality of the system.
Hayek argued that an attempt by a judge to achieve particular results in particular cases is inherently inconsistent with the rule of law:
[Wihen we obey laws, in the sense of general abstract rules laid
down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to
another man's will and are therefore free. It is because the lawgiver
does not know the particular cases to which his rules will apply, and
it is because the judge who applies them has no choice in drawing
the conclusions that follow from the existing body of rules and the
particular facts of the case, that it can be said that laws and not men
rule.64
Alexander Hamilton similarly wrote, "To avoid an arbitrary discretion
in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their
'65
duty in every particular case that comes before them.
HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 80 (1994).
63. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 153 (rev. ed. 1969).

62. F.A.

64. F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 153 (1960).
65. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 56, at 430.
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The fundamental tension between following rules and striving for
purposes or ends in particular cases cannot be eradicated because it
strikes at the very meaning of a legal rule. In earlier periods this tension was manifested in the familiar dilemma between the duty of
judges to strictly apply the law, as opposed to ensuring equity in the
individual case. Critics of equity complained that it undermines the
certain and equal application of law.
The quality of being rule-bound is the essence of a system of legality. "At the heart of the word 'formalism,"' wrote legal philosopher
Frederick Schauer, "lies the concept of decisionmaking according to
rule."' 66 What makes a rule a "rule" is that it specifies in general
terms, and in advance, a mandate that decisionmakers must follow to
the exclusion of any other considerations. The rule provides a sufficient and obligatory reason for the decision. This is true without regard to the purpose behind the rule:
In summary, it is exactly a rule's rigidity, even in the face of applications that would ill serve its purpose, that renders it a rule. This
rigidity derives from the language of the rule's formulation, which
prevents the contemplation of every fact and principle relevant to a
particular application of the rule. . . . Formalism in this sense is
therefore indistinguishable from "rulism," for what makes a regulative rule a rule, and what distinguishes it from a reason, is precisely
the unwillingness to pierce the generalization even in cases in which
67
the generalization appears to the decisionmaker to be inapposite.
If achieving an end is allowed to prevail over a rule, the rule is relegated to "a mere rule of thumb, defeasible when the purposes behind
the rule would not be served."'68 A rule of thumb is not a binding rule.
Legal philosopher David Lyons made the same basic point: a legal
system in principle cannot combine being rule-bound and trying to
achieve ends-what he calls "optimizing outcomes. '69 Achieving
ends swallows up binding rules: "To insist on maximum promotion of
satisfactions and on deference to past authoritative decisions only
when that deference could reasonably be expected to have such optimific consequences is to deny that courts are bound in the slightest
'70
degree by statutes or precedent.
66. Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) [hereinafter Schauer, Formalism]. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMI-

(1991).
67. Schauer, Formalism, supra note 66, at 535 (citation omitted).
68. Id.
69. David Lyons, Legal Formalism and Instrumentalism-A PathologicalStudy, 66 CORNELL

NATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE

L. REV. 949 (1981).

70. Id. at 967.
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In addition to the fact that striving to achieve purposes or ends detracts from the binding quality of legal rules, these are starkly dissimilar tasks. Legal theorist Duncan Kennedy explained the two
approaches:
Substantive rationality involves the expression, interaction and
measurement of values in conflict, and the assessment of the implications for those conflicting values of infinitely complex factual situations. . . . Rule application, in sharp contrast, involves the
objective or "cognitive" operation of identifying particular factual
aspects of situations followed7 1by the execution of unambiguous prescriptions for official action.
Although rule application is more involved than this description indicates, there is no question that the task of achieving purposes or
ends-which requires a judge to grapple with hard issues of social policy and future consequences-is more complicated, more uncertain,
and far less ascertainable than applying legal rules to an existing
72
situation.
There are several reasons why attention to purposes and ends raises
complex nonlegal questions and can lead to results contrary to a legal
rule. Some legal rules on the books are obsolete and inconsistent with
current policies. Some statutes are poorly drafted or embody purposes and policies that are internally at odds because they are the
product of political compromise. The main problem, however, is inherent to the nature of legal rules and will arise in the best conceived
legal regimes. Legal rules are set forth in general terms, in advance,
and cannot anticipate or account for every eventuality. Consider the
situation in which a poorly educated and dim-witted-but not incompetent-person signs a legally binding contract with punitive terms;
the harsh terms of the contract are explained to the party, who willingly signs without realizing that a much better contract could be obtained across the street. A judge committed to the formal rule of law
will duly enforce the contract according to its terms, regardless of the
outcome. A judge focused on ends will strive to find a way to ameliorate or avoid the onerous contractual terms, even though the conditions for a valid contract have clearly been met. Either way there is an
unpalatable consequence: the judge who enforces the contract will
impose a harsh and unfair result, while the judge who avoids the contract will ignore binding legal rules and tread on the legal rights and
expectations of a contracting party.
71. Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 364 (1973).
72. See UNGER, supra note 19, at 89; see also ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER,
ERN SOCIETY:

TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY

192-200 (1976).
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The situation is further complicated because alternative views of the
purposes of contract law circulate within the legal culture. The judge
in this scenario is moved by considerations of fairness, but other possible considerations include enhancing economic efficiency, preserving
the sanctity of promise or agreements, encouraging desirable business
practices, protecting vulnerable segments of the populace, and achieving certainty in contractual relations. There is no preestablished hierarchy among alternative values and purposes, and there is no set
method for resolving clashes among alternatives. In tort cases, judges
routinely weigh such considerations as the deterrence effect, the compensation for injury, the availability of products for consumers at affordable prices, the costs of injuries to society, and so forth. Analysis
of these factors relies on political, scientific, and economic considerations-many of which are debatable-and on speculative predictions
of future consequences. Judges have no particular expertise in deciding these matters. A judge who considers these purposes and ends
when applying legal rules is at sea in an embarrassingly rich set of
options.
Yet a further level of complication exists because most purposive
approaches invoke not just the purpose of a legislative or commonlaw provision-hard enough to discern-but also the purpose of an
entire area of law or of the legal system as a whole. At each higher
level of generality there is more room for disagreement and more contestable choices must be made. Moreover, explicitly stated purposes
will not necessarily be consistent with real underlying purposes. Take
the recently enacted (and subsequently repealed) South Dakota abortion ban. 73 The facial purpose was to ban abortions, but the immediate purpose, as its legislative proponents candidly admitted, was to
provoke litigation that would lead to the overturning of Roe v.
Wade.7 4 When law is a means to an end, and when there are competing views of ends, it is not evident that specific legal regimes or the
legal system as a whole will have overarching or internally consistent
purposes.
Finally, it should be recognized that the very notion of searching for
a purpose behind legislation or common-law doctrines trades on an
abstraction. Since legislators often have different intentions in mind,
and the common law is the product of innumerable judicial decisions
partaking of different streams within the law, identifying the purpose
73. Women's Health and Human Life Protection Act, H.B. 1215, 2006 Leg. Sess. (S.D. 2006)
(repealed 2006).
74. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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of a law is invariably a judicial construction. 75 Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks of the Legal Process School suggested that the purpose should
be discerned by assuming that legislators are "reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably, '76 a formulation which is
clearly an abstraction.
Judges who advocate focusing on purposes and ends concede that
this orientation is in tension with being bound to legal rules. One
champion of legal pragmatism, Judge Richard Posner, acknowledges
that "[p]ragmatic reasons do not sound very lawlike. ' 77 Justice Stephen Breyer, known as a pragmatist judge, advocates that a constitutional or legislative text should be interpreted "in light of its purpose"
with attention to "consequences, including 'contemporary conditions,
78
social, industrial, and political, of the community to be affected."'
Justice Breyer contrasts this purposive approach with the "textualist"
or "literalist" approaches identified with Justice Scalia. 79 Textualists
decide cases based upon the plain meaning of the words of the constitutional or legislative provision at the time of enactment without paying attention to purpose or consequences. Justice Breyer concedes
that under certain circumstances, his approach "would leave the Court
without a clear rule" and that "a court focused on consequences may
decide a case in a way that radically changes the law." 80
B.

The Unstable Combination of Rule-Bound and PurposeOriented Judging

Although legal theorists have put forth compelling arguments that
rule-bound judging and a focus on purposes and ends cannot in principle be combined, this combination has in fact taken place in U.S. legal
culture. Professors Philippe Nonet and Philip Selznick wrote in 1978
that judicial decisionmaking was evolving away from an emphasis on
formal legality toward utilizing instrumental rationality to achieve policies and purposes. 81 In the same year, legal theorist Patrick Atiyah
75. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 25-34 (1994).
76. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1378 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds.,

1994) (1958).
77. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32, 98 (2005).

78.

STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY:

INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION

18 (2005). For a more elaborate account of striving for purposes, see AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW (Sari Bashi trans., 2005).
79. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW

(1997).
80. BREYER, supra note 78, at 129, 119.
81. PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW

(1978).
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commented on the notable shift in judicial decisionmaking toward
"pragmatism" and greater judicial attention to achieving ends. 82 Unger commented on the issue in 1975:
[Tihe courts ... are caught between two roles with conflicting demands: the role of the traditional formalist judge, who asks what
the correct interpretation of rules of law is, and the role of the calculator of efficiencies, who seeks to determine what course of action
will most effectively serve a given goal .. . .83
A study that interviewed judges on four state supreme courts in the
late 1960s found that judges fell into three categories in their perceptions of their judicial role. About half considered themselves to be
strict law appliers, a quarter considered themselves to be lawmakers,
and a quarter considered themselves to be pragmatists who engaged
in both roles while aiming at just results and sound policy. 84 Although
more recent studies are lacking, it is fair to surmise that a greater proportion of contemporary judges are judicial pragmatists, though there
is no doubt that the other two orientations are also well represented.
Judicial decisions today routinely cite policy considerations, consider
the purposes behind the law, and pay attention to law's social
consequences.
This apparent shift in orientation toward greater consideration of
purposes and ends has not been wholesale, as the above study implies.
Moreover, movement has not taken place in only one direction; theorists have noted a "new formalism" in contract law, for example,
85
which partakes of aspects of both rule formalism and pragmatism.
Some judges remain strictly rule-oriented while others have become
more pragmatic; the same judge might be rule-oriented in certain
cases but pragmatic in others.
Despite this multifarious reality, the official line of the legal culture
is still that judges are rule-bound in their decisions. In his opening
statement in the Senate hearings for his appointment to the Supreme
Court, Justice Samuel Alito declared that "[t]he judge's only obligation-and it's a solemn obligation-is to the rule of law, and what that
means is that in every single case, the judge has to do what the law
82. P.S.

ATIYAH, FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRAGMATISM:

CHANGES IN THE FUNCTION OF THE

(1978).
supra note 19, at 99.

JUDICIAL PROCESS AND THE LAW

83.

UNGER,

84. Kenneth N. Vines, The Judicial Role in the American States: An Exploration, in
TIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH

FRON-

461, 474-77 (Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969);

see also John T. Wold, Political Orientations, Social Backgrounds, and Role Perceptions of State
Supreme Court Judges, 27 W. POL. Q. 239 (1974).

85. See Mark L. Movsesian, Rediscovering Williston, 62
(2005).
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requires. ' 86 Justice Alito, who like Justice Scalia has avowed his fidelity to the text, shares the bench with Justice Breyer, who advocates a
more purposive and consequentialist approach. This mix of judicial
philosophies amongst judges exists at all levels of the judiciary. Individual judges sometimes shift in different cases from one philosophy
to another. Justice Scalia will respect long-standing precedent even if
wrongly decided (as adjudged by original meaning) out of a prudential
unwillingness to disrupt settled legal understandings. Justice Scalia
concedes that this is a "pragmatic exception" to his textualist approach. 87 Thus, even an extremist of the rule-bound ilk may invoke
pragmatic considerations.
The result of this mishmash of contrasting orientations is a system
of judging suspended in an uncertain and shifting space, with some
judges freed of the shackles of being rigidly rule-bound (though not
entirely comfortable with this freedom) and other judges insisting on
being rule-bound (though not every time). There is no standard rule
of decision judges follow to determine when they should stick with the
rules or depart from the rules to achieve ends-nor is it clear that it is
possible to formulate such a rule. Not only are the legal rules less
binding because of more purposive and pragmatic reasoning, but the
legal system as a whole manifests a greater degree of unpredictability
because different judges exhibit different orientations amongst themselves-and even a single judge can adopt different orientations over
time. Legal theorists who have considered the situation agree that it is
detrimental to the rule of law. 88
It is conceivable that judges individually and collectively are able to
moderate these tensions in a manner that maintains a robust rule of
law system, still largely certain, equal in application, and predictable.
Not enough information about judicial reasoning and its consequences
is presently available to know for sure. But the significant consequences that may follow from a seemingly small shift in orientation
must not be underestimated. Judges formerly were oriented toward
strictly following the law (with an eye on ends); with the rise of instrumentalism, judges are encouraged to strive to achieve purposes and
ends (with an eye on the legal rules). Both orientations consider rules
and ends, but the former assigns overarching priority to the rules
while the latter elevates ends to the detriment of rules.
86. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an Associate Justice

of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (2006).
87. SCALIA, supra note 79, at 140.
88. See generally TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW, supra note 21, at 73-90.
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If judges have indeed found an ideal combination of being rulebound while considering purposes and ends, it is surely a precarious
balance to maintain. Pressure is put on this balance by the growing
view that it is naive or false to believe that judges can rule in an objective or unbiased fashion. Skepticism about judicial objectivity is the
greatest looming contemporary threat to the formal rule of law.
C. Modern Skepticism About Judicial Objectivity
All of the classic phrases used to capture the rule of law ideal identify the law with the image of the objective judge: "the rule of law, not
man; a government of laws, not men; law is reason, man is passion;
law is non-discretionary, man is arbitrary will; law is objective, man is
subjective. ' 89 Judges are mere "mouthpieces of the law." Their fidelity is to the law alone. They are unbiased, neutral, evenhanded, and
devoid of nonlegal influences. Chief Justice John Marshall insisted
that "[c]ourts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will
nothing. "90
Ever since the Legal Realists punctured the formalistic view of
judging, however, persistent doubts have remained about the accuracy
of this picture, doubts that have been exacerbated in contemporary
legal culture by the spread of postmodern views that background and
subjectivity inevitably color perception. A recent book by Lee Epstein and Jeffrey Segal, political scientists who have conducted leading
studies of judicial decisionmaking, approvingly quotes pioneer in the
field C. Herman Pritchett: "[Judges] are influenced by their own biases and philosophies, which to a large degree predetermine the position they will take on a given question. Private attitudes, in other
words, become public law." 91 Judge Posner wrote a review of the
Rehnquist Court's final term and asserted that "[tjhe evidence of the
influence of policy judgments, and hence of politics, on constitutional
adjudication in the Supreme Court lies everywhere at hand. ' 92 While
Judge Posner's statement is directed at judging on the Supreme Court,
he clearly believes that most judges are influenced by their personal
ideologies and other nonlegal factors when deciding cases. 93 In a
comprehensive study of federal appellate judging, prominent legal
89. Id. at 122-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
90. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824).
91. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS 3 (2005) (quoting C. Herman Pritchett, Divisions of Opinion Among Justices of
the U.S. Supreme Court, 1939-1941, 35 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 890, 890 (1941)).
92. Posner, supra note 77, at 46.
93. See generally NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE
LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS (2005).
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scholars flatly stated that "[n]o reasonable person seriously doubts
that ideology, understood as normative commitments of various sorts,
'94
helps to explain judicial votes."
This perception has also penetrated the public, exacerbated by the
rampant politicization of the judicial appointment process in recent
years: "When asked if 'in many cases judges are really basing their
decisions on their own personal beliefs' 56% [of the public] agree and
only 36% disagree. ' 95 Yet, confirming the continuing hold of the objective judge ideal, a poll taken during the Alito hearings found that
69% of the public believes that the personal views of the Justices
96
should not have a role in their decisions.
For the sake of reducing the degree of complexity, the discussion in
the preceding Part assumed that judges objectively resolve questions
about the interpretation of the law and about the appropriate purpose, social policy, or outcome in a given case. But questions about
subjectivity cannot be kept apart from the debate over whether judges
should be strictly rule-oriented or should also focus on purposes and
ends. Text-oriented critics object that purposive or pragmatist approaches involve wide-ranging inquiries beyond the interpretation and
application of legal rules, inquiries that invite, if not require, judges to
draw upon their subjective views.
Similar criticisms about the necessity for personal judicial choices
have been lodged against another major theory of interpretation, the
"principles approach," urged by Ronald Dworkin and others who insist that judges apply background moral, political, or natural law principles. 97 Textualists like Justice Scalia and pragmatists like Judge
Posner argue that principles approaches are plagued by controversial
questions of value. 98 Although proponents of the principles approach
think these questions are resolvable on some objective basis, critics
insist that value choices are concealed and couched in the terminology
of broader principles. 99
Questions about judicial objectivity also apply to textualist or literalist approaches that claim to strictly apply legal rules. Alternative
readings of rules and their meanings are often still available; their ap94. Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal
Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REv. 301, 352 (2004).
95. Judges and the American Public's View of Them, Results of the Maxwell Poll (Oct. 2005),
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/news/maxwellpoll.pdf.
96. Poll: Americans "Undecided" on Alito, CBS News (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.cbsnews.
com/stories/2006/01/09/opinion/polls/main1192317.shtml?CMP=ILCsearchstories.
97. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
98. SCALIA, supra note 79; Posner, supra note 77.
99. See generally SCALIA, supra note 79; Posner, supra note 77.
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plication to novel or unanticipated circumstances involves choices,
and open-ended standards and principles require judgments. 1°° Moreover, even textualist judges make exceptions, which suggests that they
have room to maneuver when they so desire.
So whether one is a textualist, a pragmatist, or an advocate of legal
principles, the same fundamental question must be confronted: to
what extent do judges' subjective views infect their purportedly objective legal decisions on the correct application of legal rules and the
correct identification of purposes and ends?
Many observers, to repeat the challenge, interpret Legal Realism
and postmodernism to have taught that the fundamental distinction
between an objective perspective and a subjective perspective is illusory. A judge's personal preferences inevitably color that judge's conclusion about the correct interpretation of the legal rules and about
the correct ends in a case. The judge's subjectively desired ends shape
how the judge selects, interprets, and utilizes the applicable legal
rules. Judges who attempt in good faith to render decisions in an objective fashion, striving to screen out the influence of subjective views,
will nevertheless fail, according to this view, because the process operates subconsciously beneath their awareness.
The threat posed to the rule of law by this set of ideas cannot be
exaggerated. If judges substantially base their legal decisionswhether involving rule application alone, or some combination of
rules and ends-upon their personal views, then the rule of law ideal
is a fraud. Judges are still constrained in that they must work within
acceptable legal conventions, but these conventions and the available
body of rules and exceptions are malleable enough to provide judges
the leeway to reach desired outcomes much of the time. "The 'law,'
and the professional norms associated with it," according to Professor
Cornell Clayton, "become mere instruments or barriers that judges
must utilize strategically to advance their a priori political objectives."' 0 1 The private will of the particular judge is determinative.
This threat is enhanced by the fact that, since the 1960s and 1970s,
law schools have taught students to view and use legal rules instrumentally-to be marshaled and manipulated to achieve ends. This
orientation toward legal rules is reinforced in the practice of law.
Lawyers who ascend to the bench after a lengthy indoctrination in an
100. For a development of both sides of the argument, see BREYER, supra note 78 and
supra note 79.
101. Cornell W. Clayton, The Supply and Demand Sides of Judicial Policy-Making (Or, Why
Be So Positive About the Judicialization of Politics?), 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer
2002, at 69, 83.
SCALIA,
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instrumental view of law will find it easy to approach legal rules instrumentally rather than as binding dictates; they will find it natural to
think about outcomes they personally believe are right and to try to
arrange and interpret the legal rules to reach these outcomes.
To the extent that personal attitudes dictate legal decisions, stability, certainty, predictability, and equality of application will suffer because the outcomes of cases will vary in accordance with the divergent
personal views of judges. Ex ante, every legal dispute is a crapshoot
whose outcome can be predicted only after the case is assigned and
the personal predilections of the individual judge are known. Supreme Court watchers already have this mindset, routinely engaging
1 02
in vote counting along political lines.
A legal system shot through with subjectively influenced, willful
judging would pose a dire threat to the rule of law. A more careful
examination, however, reveals that things are not quite as bad as this
scenario suggests. Not yet anyway. The threat to the rule of law
posed by this complex of ideas is not that judges are incapable of rendering decisions in an objective fashion. Rather, the threat is that
judges come to believe that it cannot be done or believe that most
fellow judges are not doing it. This skepticism-were it to become
pervasive among lawyers, judges, and the public-becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy that precipitates a collapse in the rule of law.
The prevailing skepticism about judicial objectivity is based upon a
widely shared misunderstanding of Legal Realism and postmodernism, neither of which deny that there is a real and meaningful difference between instructing judges to render decisions objectively,
dictated by the law, and instructing judges to render whatever decisions they think are right.
D. Realists and the Possibility of Judicial Objectivity
The Realist critique of rule formalism came in two versions. Radical rule skeptics, like Jerome Frank in his most extreme moments
(before he became a judge), denied that legal rules determine judicial
decisions. 10 3 Judges arrive at decisions they subjectively prefer, then
work backwards, manipulating legal rules to support these predetermined ends. In contrast, the criticisms of moderate Realists were not
entirely skeptical of legal rules, only of certain unrealistic claims about
the rules. They put forth a negative argument that denied that rule
102. See Molly McDonough, Pitchingto a New Lineup: Supreme Court PractitionersWill Aim
Their Arguments at Different Justices, ABA J. EREPORT, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.abanet.org/
journal/redesign/f3sct.html.
103. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
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application is a purely mechanical process, and they denied formalist
claims that there are no gaps or conflicts in the applicable legal rules.
Judges regularly have leeway within the applicable body of legal rules
and exceptions, and they are required or able to make choices. Unlike the arguments of radical rule skeptics, this more moderate critique does not deny that judges decide cases in accordance with rules,
and it does not claim that decisions are always determined by what
judges personally prefer.
Karl Llewellyn and Felix Cohen, two leading Realists, asserted that
there is a shared craft to legal interpretation and legal argument which
makes it a relatively stable and predictable exercise that is not entirely
determined by the personal views of judges. Cohen criticized the
"hunch" theory of judging because it improperly denies "the relevance of significant, predictable, social determinants that govern the
course of judicial decision."' 1 4 He added that "actual experience does
reveal a significant body of predictable uniformity in the behavior of
courts." 10 5 Cohen insisted that judicial decisions must be understood
as "more than an expression of individual personality";10 6 they are the
product of an institutional legal context that insures consistency. He
speculated, calling it "guesswork," that a judge's decisions may be affected by class attitudes, but Cohen also insisted that "judges are
craftsmen, with aesthetic ideals, concerned with the aesthetic judgments that the bar and the law schools will pass upon their awkward
or skillful, harmonious or unharmonious, anomalous or satisfying, actions and theories.' 1 7 The shared understandings and practices of legal argument provide constraints on judges. After opining that the
ambiguity of legal material allows judges "to throw the decision this
way or that," Llewellyn tempered this by recognizing that "while it is
possible to build a number of divergent logical ladders up out of the
same cases and down again to the same dispute, there are not so many
10 8
that can be built defensibly."
John Chipman Gray, who the Realists admired, recognized that
judges "decide cases otherwise than they would have decided them
had the precedents not existed, and they follow the precedents, al'10 9
though they may think that they ought not to have been made.
Realist hero Justice Holmes once said, "It has given me great pleasure
104. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 843 (1935).
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to sustain the Constitutionality of laws that I believe to be as bad as
possible, because I thereby helped to mark the difference between
what I would forbid and what the Constitution permits." 110 It was his
view that, notwithstanding the presence of discretion, judicial decisions can and should conform to the law."' Justice Holmes's critique
of the majority in the Lochner case was precisely that the personal
laissez-faire views of the judges were an improper basis for a constitutional decision: "I strongly believe," Justice Holmes stated in his dissent, "that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the
right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.""n 2 When called
upon to make decisions that turn on policy, Justice Holmes felt that
the duty of the judge was to find the correct social policy, not to sim3
ply enact the judge's own policy preference.1
Justice Benjamin Cardozo, another favorite of the Realists, explained as follows:
In countless litigations, the law is so clear that judges have no discretion. They have the right to legislate within gaps, but often there
are no gaps. We shall have a false view of the landscape if we look
at the waste spaces only, and refuse to see the acres already sown
and fruitful .... Judges have, of course, the power, though not the
right, to ignore the mandate of a statute, and render judgment in
despite of it. They have the power, though not the right, to travel
beyond the walls of the interstices, the bounds set to judicial innovation by precedent and custom.
None the less, by that abuse of
114
power, they violate the law.
Justice Cardozo acknowledged that the personal views of judges have
an impact, but not to a degree that is completely outcome determinative: "So sweeping a statement exaggerates the element of free volition. It ignores the factors of determinism which cabin and confine
within narrow bounds the range of unfettered choice." 1 5 "The
judge," Justice Cardozo concluded, "even when he is free, is still not
116
wholly free."'

110. Louis MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB 67 (2001) (quoting Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to John T. Morse (Nov. 28, 1926)).
111. See MORRIS R. COHEN, Justice Holmes and the Nature of Law, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL
ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 198, 213 (Archon Books 1967) (1933).
112. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
113. See MORTON G. WHITE, SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA: THE REVOLT AGAINST FORMALISM 208-09 (1949).
114. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 129 (1921).
115. Id. at 170.
116. Id. at 141.
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Many Realists took a middle position, articulated by philosopher
Morris Cohen, that avoided the extremes of mechanical reasoning or
rule skepticism:
[T]he judge's feelings as to right and wrong must be logically and
scientifically trained. The trained mind sees in a flash of intuition
that which the untrained mind can succeed in seeing only after painfully treading many steps. They who scorn the idea of the judge as a
logical automaton are apt to fall into the opposite error of exaggerating as irresistible the force of bias or prejudice. But the judge who
realizes before listening to a case that all men are biased is more
likely to make a conscientious effort at impartiality than one who
to the bench makes him at once an organ of
believes that elevation 117
infallible logical truth.
The Realist reminder that judges are subject to subconscious influences was meant to help them be vigilant toward and overcome these
influences; it was not a call to an inevitable surrender. The Realists
believed and advocated that judicial decisions should not be entirely
the products of judges' personal views and ideologies, and they did
not consider this a hopeless demand.
E.

Postmodernism and Judicial Objectivity

The Realists did not, of course, have the final say on the matter.
Although problems of relativism and subjectivity were well known at
the time the Realists wrote, they lived before postmodernism drove
deep doubts about the possibility of objectivity into legal culture and
society. Postmodernism suggests that "[t]he human subject is an embodied agent, acting and judging in a context that can never be wholly
objectified, with orientations and motivations that can never be fully
grasped or controlled."' 1 8 According to this view, judges subconsciously see the law through an ideologically colored lens, no matter
how sincerely motivated they might be to decide objectively.
This is not the place to put forth a detailed response to postmodernism, but two quick responses can be given that accept the basic
postmodern proposition while denying its skeptical implications." 19
Judges indeed approach the law from the standpoint of their personal
views. More immediately, however, they see the law through the lens
of the legal tradition into which they have been indoctrinated, and
117. MORRIS R. COHEN, The Place of Logic in the Law, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER,
supra note 111, at 165, 182-83.
118. TARNAS, supra note 5, at 396.
119. See generally BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY: PRAGMATISM
AND A SOCIAL THEORY OF LAW (1997) [hereinafter TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY] (presenting a comprehensive response to postmodemism).
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from within the conventions of legal practice and judging in which
they participate. The totality of the legal tradition has the effect of
stabilizing legal meaning and providing restraints on the influence of
the subjective views. Law is a socially produced and shared activity
that participants are not free to utilize in any way they desire. Unacceptable interpretations that do not comport with shared understandings of legal rules simply "will not write." Judges who stretch legal
rules beyond recognition risk disapproval from colleagues on a panel
or an embarrassing rebuke on appellate review. These social and institutional mechanisms perpetuate and enforce conformity in the interpretation of legal rules.
This account incorporates the postmodern insight about the influence of background views on how people see the world, merely adding the reminder that the legal tradition is such a body of
background views, which becomes an integrated aspect of the judge's
own perspective. 120 The Realists said as much in their emphasis on
the craft of lawyering. Subconscious personal influences are not completely suppressed under this account, but must pass through a filtering perspective. This still leaves much room to maneuver, of course,
and willful judges can always manipulate legal rules to achieve the
ends they desire (though at the risk of reversal). But most judges
most of the time consciously strive to render decisions in an objective
fashion, and there is sufficient stability and constraint within the legal
tradition to make this process real.
The second response is that nothing in postmodernism denies that
conscious orientation makes a real and important difference in behavior. The postmodern insight that subjective influences on perception
are pervasive and not entirely repressible relates to subconscious influences, saying nothing direct about the implications of conscious orientations. Conscious orientation is a fundamental causal factor in
behavior. The widely accepted view that our ideas, beliefs, and actions substantially construct social reality is built upon the causal efficacy of intentional orientations. 12 1 Even accepting the irreducible
presence of subconscious influences on perspective and judgments,
therefore, objectivity in legal decisions is real and achievable in the
conscious attitudes and motivations of judges who are committed to
following the law.
Excluding the Supreme Court, this assertion is borne out by the
high percentage of unanimous decisions rendered by panels of judges
120. See generally id. at 196-244.
121. See generally JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION

OF SOCIAL REALITY

(1995).
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with different ideological views.' 22 The bulk of empirical studies of
judicial decisionmaking suggest that "ideological values play a less
prominent role in the lower federal courts."' 23 Studies of appellate
court decisions have found that, while political considerations have
some effect, legal doctrine appears to have an overarching influence. 124 Judges typically follow binding precedent. 125 Although Judge
Posner claims that "[t]here is almost no legal outcome that a really
skillful legal analyst cannot cover with a professional varnish, 1 2 6 he
admits this occurs only "when the law is uncertain and emotions
aroused.' 127 In many cases, the law is relatively clear and the judges
are not emotionally aroused. The comprehensive study by Sunstein,
Schkade, and Ellman, cited earlier for the proposition that personal
ideology affects judging, demonstrated ideology-correlated differences in the voting patterns of Democratic and Republican federal
appellate judges, but they nonetheless found that there was a great
deal of agreement in their legal decisions: "It would be possible to see
our data as suggesting that most of the time, the law is what matters,
'128
not ideology.
None of this denies that with respect to the Supreme Court there is
compelling evidence to believe that the personal views of the judges
have a substantial impact on their decisions. 12 9 This is a unique court,
however, the conduct of which cannot be extrapolated to others. The
problem is that the Supreme Court example, and the extreme
politicization that now surrounds judicial appointments on the federal
and state levels, may have begun to infect other courts. Studies suggest that lower level federal judicial appointments have become more
122. See Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L.

REV. 1335, 1338 (1998); Patricia M. Wald, A Response to Tiller and Cross, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
235, 246-47 (1999).
123. Donald R. Songer & Susan Haire, Integrating Alternative Approaches to the Study of
Judicial Voting: Obscenity Cases in the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 963, 964

(1992). For a review of political science studies on judicial decisionmaking up through the mid1990s, see TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY, supra note 119, at 196-227.
124. See Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L.
REV. 1457, 1462-82 (2003); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanshipand Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeas, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,

2175-76 (1998).
125. Gregory C. Sisk et al., Charting the Influences on the JudicialMind: An Empirical Study
of Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1496-99 (1998).
126. Posner, supra note 77, at 52.
127. Id. at 48 (emphasis added).
128. Sunstein, Schkade & Ellman, supra note 94, at 336.
129. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).
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ideologically charged in the past few decades, and the decisions of
130
lower court judges have shown an uptick in partisanship.
F.

The Significance of a Consciously Rule-Bound Orientation

Imagine two judges, both with politically conservative personal
views: one decides cases with a conscious orientation that strives to
abide by the binding dictates of applicable legal rules to come up with
the most correct legal interpretation in each case (the Consciously
Bound judge, or CB); a second judge decides cases with a conscious
orientation that strives to achieve ideologically preferred ends in each
case and interprets and manipulates the legal rules to the extent necessary to achieve the ends desired (the Consciously Ends-Oriented
judge, or CEO).
Add four realistic conditions to this scenario. First, notwithstanding
this conscious orientation, CB is subconsciously influenced by and
sees the law through background personal views; the legal interpretations of CB are thus not completely free of political influences in this
subconscious sense. Second, CEO is not able to achieve ends with
total disregard for conventional legal understandings because decisions must be plausible in terms of legal conventions and maintain the
external appearance of being rule-bound; the legal interpretations of
CEO are thus not completely devoid of legal constraints. Third, in a
large subset of cases, the legal rules allow for more than one legally
plausible outcome, though usually one outcome can be ranked as
more legally compelling or defensible than the others. Finally, in a
small subset of cases the legal rules are open or invite external considerations, such that the judge cannot avoid rendering a judgment based
upon nonlegal factors. Note that these conditions accept all of the
major points made by the Legal Realists as well as postmodern critics.
Now imagine that, in a given case, both judges arrive at precisely
the same outcome, supported by identical written decisions; had they
been sitting together on a panel, they would have joined opinions.
They are led to the same result and use the same reasoning because
both judges adopt the same theory of constitutional interpretation.
The difference is that CB settles upon the theory as the correct way to
interpret the Constitution following a sincere and exhaustive study of
constitutional law, whereas CEO settles upon the theory because it
tends to support the outcomes the judge personally prefers, and CEO
is willing to depart from or "adjust" the theory when necessary to
achieve the desired end in particular cases.
130. See generally SCHERER, supra note 93.
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Although the judges' decisions are literally identical in external
form and in consequence, a strong argument can be made based upon
their differing orientations that CB's decision is faithfully law-abiding
while CEO's decision is an abusive exercise of power in the guise of
law.
This scenario is meant to tease out the essential difference between
subconscious influences on judging and willful judging. The sophisticated postmodern recognition that judges' background views subconsciously influence their interpretation of the law is correct. It is also
correct that sometimes the law runs out or requires judgment calls.
Too often, however, a leap is made from these points to the conclusion
that judges are deluded, naive, or lying when they claim that their
decisions are determined by the law. To the extent that a judge is
consciously rule-bound when engaging in judging, the judge is correct
in claiming to be rule-bound in the only sense that this phrase can be
humanly achieved. Since judging is a human practice, it makes no
sense to evaluate the decisionmaking of judges by reference to a standard that is impossible to achieve. There are other aspects to proper
judging, like not favoring one side or the other, but being consciously
rule-bound is the essence of a system of the rule of law.
To be sure, owing to subconscious influences on how the law is seen,
the legal decisions of CBs with conservative views would differ somewhat from those of CBs with liberal views, but their legal decisions
would also substantially overlap. The decisions of conservative CEOs
and liberal CEOs, in contrast, would diverge markedly, with minimal
overlap only when the applicable law and legal conventions allow little room to maneuver. As this contrast shows, a system comprised
entirely of CBs would be rule-bound and largely predictable based
upon the strength of legal considerations.
Now imagine a system filled entirely with CEOs. That would be a
different system, one which is "legal" in external form only; it would
manifest legal reasoning and decisions that are quite different from a
system filled with CBs. The judges in this scenario willfully strive to
achieve ends, manipulating the legal rules as required (even if for
well-meaning reasons), restrained by the law only in the weak sense
that legal conventions will rule out certain outcomes. Skeptics like
Judge Posner, and political scientists who dismiss the significance of
the conscious orientation of judges toward being rule-bound, miss this
larger picture and the fundamental difference between a system populated by CBs and one populated by CEOs.
Statistical correlations that political scientists have documented between the decisions of judges and their personal ideologies are to
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some degree a reflection of irrepressible subconscious influences, and
to some degree a reflection of the openness of the law-open either
because the legal answer is unclear or the law calls upon the judge to
make a nonlegal determination (factors which are more prevalent at
higher level courts). These correlations, however, are never complete
and are higher for certain judges than for others.13 1 With respect to
those judges who manifest relatively higher correlations between their
personal attitudes and their legal decisions when compared to judges
in the same circumstances (Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice William Douglas in certain classes of cases had correlations above
90%),132 it is fair to surmise that their conscious orientation is less
rule-bound in comparison to their colleagues. From the standpoint of
the rule of law, they can be condemned for this reason.
G. A Closer Look at a PragmaticJudge
A pragmatic judge who focuses on outcomes is more like a CEO
than a CB. "The way I approach a case as a judge," Judge Posner
stated, "is first to ask myself what would be a reasonable, sensible
result, as a lay person would understand it, and then, having answered
that question, to ask whether that result is blocked by clear constitutional or statutory text, governing precedent, or any other conventional limitation on judicial discretion.' 13 3 This is not "decisionmaking according to rule," which is what being rule-bound requires,
but decisionmaking according to the judge's sense of what is right, all
things considered, unless prohibited by the law.
This is not an abstract point. Judge Posner offered his description
of judging in a debate over the legality of the Bush Administration's
warrantless surveillance program to combat terrorism. Security experts and the public are sharply divided over the value, necessity, and
consequences of the program. A pragmatic judge searching for a
"reasonable" result "as a lay person would understand it" could easily
come down on either side of the issue, and throw up colorable legal
arguments to justify either outcome. This does not suggest, however,
that a decision according to the law would lead equally to both outcomes. The stronger legal position may be passed over in lieu of the
weaker position by a judge reasoning pragmatically, because the
weaker argument cannot be ruled out. Under this approach, the indi131. See generally id. (presenting a collection of such studies for lower federal courts).
132. See TAMANAHA, REALISTIC SOCIO-LEGAL THEORY, supra note 119, at 196-227.
133. Richard A. Posner & Philip B. Heymann, A TNR Online Debate:
REPUBLIC ONLINE,

posner013106.

Tap Dancing,

NEW

Jan. 31, 2006, https://ssl.tnr.com/p/docsub.mhtml?i=w0601308&s=heymann

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:469

vidual who happens to be the judge will dictate the outcome-and not
the law. This example illustrates the legitimate concern of opponents
of the pragmatic approach that it invites judges to render contestable
value decisions, that it would reduce equality of application, and that
it would generate uncertainty in the law.
The sine qua non of the rule of law is striving to decide cases according to the law. Over time, the decisions of Judge Posner's pragmatist judge, who resembles a CEO in approaching legal rules with a
controlling end in mind, would diverge from the decisions of a judge
who is oriented toward doing what the law requires (rather than doing
whatever the law does not disallow). A bench filled with pragmatic
judges, in other words, would be a bench filled with CEOs, undercutting the rule-bound nature of the system.
H.

The Rule of Law Hinges on Being Consciously Rule-Bound

The present threat to the rule of law, to return to the key point, is
not that it is impossible for judges to be consciously rule-bound when
rendering their decisions, striving to set aside subjective preferences
and abide by the legal rules. Rather, the threat comes from the belief
that it cannot be done and the choice not to do it. In the present
atmosphere, with prevailing misunderstandings about the Realist position and about the implications of postmodernism, judges may become convinced that to decide in a rule-bound fashion is a chimerical
or na've aspiration. They may think other judges are instrumentally
manipulating legal rules to reach ends they personally desire, cloaking
their personal preferences in legal logic. The temptation to do so is
multiplied when judges recognize that, at least on the federal level and
increasingly on the state level, their ideological views were a major
consideration in securing their appointment, and everyone involved
expects that their views will influence their legal decisions.
Nothing can be done about the subconscious springs of human intellect. What is not inevitable is that a judge would cross over from
abiding by the binding quality of law, sincerely striving to figure out
and adhere to what the law requires (however uncertain), to instrumentally manipulating the legal rules to reach a particular end, much
as a lawyer does in service of the client. A judge will be bound by the
law only to the extent that the judge believes it is possible to be bound
by the law and sees it as a solemn obligation to render legally bound
and determined decisions. Living up to this obligation is the particular virtue of judging.
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CONCLUSION

Taken together, the four themes covered in this Article present a
worrisome picture for those who consider the rule of law an important
ideal. A purely instrumental view deprives law of any internal moral
integrity: law becomes an empty vessel that can be used to do anything, no matter how reprehensible. Disputes over the common
good-or more precisely, disputes between groups aggressively pursuing their own vision and interests-dominate the legal landscape,
showing up in battles over judicial appointments, legislation, and administrative and executive actions. These battles leave the losers, and
those excluded from the contest entirely, in the position of seeing the
law as a weapon wielded against them rather than as a public product
that protects the public welfare and generates an obligation of obedience. The apparent shift begun in the 1960s and 1970s towards more
purposive and pragmatic reasoning in judicial decisions comes at the
expense of binding legal rules. Widespread skepticism about the ability of judges to render objective decisions based upon the law threatens to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. These developments, in turn,
encourage the politicization of judicial selections, with a resultant
politicization of judicial decisions.
The rule of law tradition in U.S. legal culture is deeply rooted and
resilient, and it has defied previous predictions of its imminent demise. Indeed, no legal culture that has heretofore achieved the rule of
law has ever witnessed its complete demise, a fact which offers considerable reassurance. The rule of law is a widespread and entrenched
cultural attitude as much as a political ideal, which makes it difficult to
obtain where it is lacking and which protects it from elimination
where it exists. This is not, however, a reason to take it for granted. If
the rule of law in the United States does significantly deteriorate,
more so than has already occurred, the factors spelled out in this Article will have contributed.
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